Dr. Marnix Dekker
Prof. David M. Nicol
Prof. Awais Rashid
CRITIS 2019 will provide en excellent program with interesting keynote speakers, high-quality paper presentations and social events. A preliminary program overview is shown below.
|Monday Sep 23||Tuesday Sep 24||Wednesday Sep 25|
|09.00-10.15||Technical session||09.00-10.00||Technical session||09.00-10.00||Technical session|
|10.45-12.15||Technical session||10.30-12.00||Technical session||10.30-12.00||Technical session|
|12.15-13.45||Lunch at Mjellerumsgården||12.00-13.30||Lunch at Universitetsklubben||12.00-13.30||Lunch at Universitetsklubben|
|13.45-15.15||Technical session||13.30-15.15||Technical session||13.30-15.15||Technical session|
|15.45-17.45||Technical session||15.45-17.15||Technical session|
|18.15-20.00||Reception at Vricon||19.00-22.00||Conference banquet and tour of Swedish Air Force Museum|
Keynote speaker presentations
|Dr. Marnix Dekker,
Cybersecurity expert, at ENISA, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity breach reporting in the EU
Marnix Dekker works at ENISA, the EU agency for Cybersecurity, as NIS Directive coordinator and breach reporting team lead. Marnix will speak about cyber security breach reporting, a cornerstone of EU cybersecurity legislation. He will explain the approach, processes, tooling and experiences from 9 years of breach reporting in the telecom sector and discuss challenges and pitfalls. He will also discuss the new breach reporting under the NIS Directive and discuss some of the opportunities and challenges here.
|Prof. David M. Nicol,
Director, Information Trust Institute Franklin W. Woeltge Professor of
Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Challenges in Quantifying An Adversary's Cyber Access to Critical Infrastructures
Critical infrastructures such as the power grid, up and down stream components of oil and gas production, communication network, transportation networks and so on are now all controlled by devices with CPUs and memory that communicate over both wireline and wireless channels. Quantitative assessment of risk to the controlled infrastructure depends both on models and analysis of the infrastructure under attack, and of the adversary's ability to mount those attacks. To quantitatively assess the risk to the critical infrastructure of cyber-mischief we have to be able to quantitatively assess that component of the risk which depends on the adversary's cyber access to devices which measure and manipulate the physical system. There are myriad challenges in this subproblem, which derive from the adversary's learning by moving laterally through the network, on the state of knowledge and lack of knowledge about means by which the adversary can make those movements, on quantifying the difficulty of exploiting vulnerabilities as that lateral movement is made. This talk highlights the challenges as we see them after working on this and related problems for several years.
|Prof. Awais Rashid,
Professor of Cyber Security,
University of Bristol
Everything is Awesome! Or is it? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure
Industrial Control Systems play an important role in the monitoring, control, and automation of critical infrastructure such as water, gas, oil, and electricity. Recent years have seen a number of high profile cyber attacks on such infrastructure exemplified by Stuxnet and the Ukrainian Power Grid attacks. This naturally begs the question: how should we manage cyber security risks in such infrastructure on which the day-to-day functioning of our society relies? What are the complexities of managing security in a landscape shaped by the often competing demands of a variety of stakeholders, e.g., managers, control engineers, enterprise IT personnel and field site operators? What are the challenges posed by the convergence of IoT and critical infrastructure through the so-called Industrial Internet of Things? And will frameworks such as the EU NIS directive help mitigate the cyber security risks to critical infrastructure? This talk will discuss insights from a multi-year programme of research investigating these issues and the challenges to addressing them.
Head of planning and crisis management at the ministry for the ecological and inclusive transition, France
Hybrid Threats Impact on Crisis Management
Historically the terrorist threats were mainly constituted of physical actions. They took different forms which evolved during the twentieth century in a continuous way with increasing consequences and effects. The eleventh September 2001 attacks were a real strategic surprise but only involving "classical" operational means. Then the cyber threats were considered and they introduced a new dimension of complexity and capacities for the terrorists. Since 2001 everything can be considered as possible, with the cyber threats this means that attacks can be controlled from far away and the systemic dimension of cyber also changes the nature of the threats from a physically limited act to a systemic act which can reach simultaneously every point connected with the system. Recently, a new dimension appeared linked to the social networks and to the flow of news which are not checked before being published by medias, both of them opening the door to the proliferation of fake news. This new dimension has already been used in France by the "Yellow Jackets" in order to win the battle for public opinion. The hybrid threat is in fact nothing more than a cocktail of physical event potentially combined with a cyber-attack and a fake news flow on social networks based on a deformed reality. If the previous situations were handled by security and cyber-security specialists using professional tools, this new type of threat requires a global involvement of the whole company and even of its partners and customers. This means that new skills and a globalizing approach must be developed based on human sciences more than on tools. This is the condition to be able to set up the barriers to prevent, deter, identify, delay, react and recover to and from these new kind of actions.